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THE CAMPAIGN-FINANCE CRUCIBLE: IS
LAISSEZ FAIR?

Jamin B. Raskin*
By
Bradley A. Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2001. Pp. xiv,
286. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $17.95.
UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM.

A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN
By Bruce A ckerman and Ian Ayres. New Haven: Yale Uni
versity Press. 2002. Pp. x, 303. $29.95.
VOTING

WITH DOLLARS:

FINANCE.

The 2001 passage of the B ipartisan Campaign Reform Act
("BCRA"), popularly known as "McCain-Feingold," set the stage for
a momentous constitutional conflict in the United States Supreme
Court in the 2003-04 Term. Among other things, the new legislation
bans "soft money" contributions to the national political parties by
corporations, labor unions, and individuals; prohibits state parties that
are authorized to a�cept such contributions to spend the proceeds on
activities related to federal elections; forbids federal candidates to par
ticipate in raising soft money; doubles the amount of "hard money" an
individual can contribute in a federal election from $1 ,000 to $2,000
and increases the amount an individual can give in aggregate to all
federal candidates, parties, and political action committees ("PACs")
in a year from $25,000 to $30,000; bans all federal contributions by
minors; and prohibits the expenditure of corporation and union treas
ury funds on "electioneering communications," defined as television
or radio-broadcast advertisements that refer to a federal candidate (or
candidates) and appear within thirty days of a primary election or sixty
days of a general election.1
The new Jaw opens a pandora's box of constitutional brain teasers
that the Court will have to solve. But it takes our polity further down a
certain road. This is the road of compromise regulation of our
multibillion-dollar campaign-finance regime. On this middling path,
we accept the fundamental and intractable role of private money in
public elections, but we do our best to regulate both its attendant
"corruption," defined narrowly as the trading of campaign contribu* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. A.B. 1983, J.D.
1987, Harvard. - Ed.

1.

See generally

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 -56 (2003).
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tions for political influence and favor, and also its attendant "appear
ance of corruption."2 This latter concept is odd since we do not usually
conclude that the appearance of a problem creates a sufficiently
compelling interest to <,lVerride freedom of speech. For example, while
we can certainly legislate within the bounds of the First Amendment
to criminalize obscenity3 or incitement to imminent lawless action,4 we
cannot constitutionally criminalize the appearance of obscenity or the
appearance of incitement to imminent lawless action. How can pre
venting the appearance of corruption constitute an interest sufficiently
compelling to justify burdens on speech?
In any event, we have chosen the middle path of modest regulation
against two alternative paths that lead in opposite directions: a totally
deregulated free market in campaign contributions and expenditures
in which political money is treated as simply a proxy and vehicle for
speech; and a public-finance regime in which we do our best to abolish
the power of private money and treat campaigns as a public process
like the election itself.
If the Supreme Court upholds the BCRA, we will likely continue
on this middle road. Individual private-campaign contributions will
grow rapidly, perhaps even doubling in the 2004 elections given the
increased giving limits. Corporations and unions, perhaps now forbid
den to contribute soft money and produce "electioneering" ads, will
have a diminished role for a while but will soon enough find other
ways to make their influence felt. We will see no sharp policy depar
tures that either deregulate or substitute for the present market in
campaign-finance capital.
Yet, if the Court invalidates large chunks of the BCRA, as it
is likely to do, the forces of reform will have to conclude that the
century-long effort to contain and channel private money has reached
a dead end. The only viable progressive alternative to the status quo
will be some kind of national public-financing regime written in such a
way as to permit candidates to opt out and go private if they like, as is
required by the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo,5 but otherwise
gives candidates the public means to run a serious campaign in return
for forswearing private contributions. In the meantime, the ambigui
ties, contradictions, and gaps in the current compromise regime will
give greater political impetus to Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)
and other conservatives who think that political money, regardless of
its source or its destination, should run free like a river. After the
invalidation of the BCRA, reform will focus on creating a parallel

2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976) (per curiam).
3. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1 976) (per curiam).
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public regime and conservative resistance will focus on throwing away
even the skeletal regulations we have.
Thus, it is a fine time to examine two books - Bradley Smith's
Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform,6 which will
appeal to conservatives, and Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres's Voting
with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance,7 which may
intrigue liberals - that imagine sweeping changes to our campaign
finance regime.
I.
In Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform, Bradley
Smith has written an impassioned and eloquent defense of a free mar
ket in the financing of America's political campaigns. One is tempted
to call Professor Smith's work the definitive libertarian statement
about campaign finance: indeed, the Cato Institute and other self
described libertarian groups fighting campaign-finance reform have
ardently promoted his ideas.8 But there are revealing evasions in his
argument - specifically about the role of private corporations, the
public self-subsidies engineered by incumbents, and the acceptability
of compulsory-disclosure rules - that complicate and cast doubt on
his libertarianism. These equivocations make him, in the final analysis,
more the conservative champion of the status quo than the visionary
of a systematically deregulated libertarian regime of money in politics
or the apostle of law-and-economics seeking to abolish rent-seeking
behavior. While he succeeds in exposing the illiberal "folly" of
much conventional reform, he ultimately fails to show how we might
redesign public institutions to open up our politics to new voices, new
choices, greater participation, and more political freedom.
Professor Smith has served since May of 2000 as a Republican
designated member on the Federal Election Commission, a position
he secured over the protests of the Brennan Center for Justice, Vice
President Al Gore, and other advocates of reform. From this perch,
Commissioner Smith battles greater campaign regulation. Yet one
hopes that his short-term regulatory agenda does not keep him from

6. Professor of Law, Capital University Law School.
7. Both are professors at Yale Law School.
See, e.g., BRADLEY A. SMITH, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION: FAULTY
ASSUMPTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis Paper

8.

No. 238, 1995), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa238.html (last visited May 30,
2003). The Cato Institute has featured Smith on numerous occasions, including upon publi
cation of Unfree Speech at an author's forum on March 21, 2001, where I acted as respon
dent. See also Bradley A. Smith, Should "Committing Politics" Be a Crime? The Cases for
Deregulating Campaign Finance, FREE SPEECH & ELECrlON L. PRAC. G ROUPNEWS (Fed
eralist Society, Wash., D.C. ) , Feb. 27, 1997, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/
practicegroupnewsletters/freespeech&electionlaw/fs010202.htm (last visited May 30, 2003).
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spelling out a more robust and systematic political libertarianism that
could be a meaningful contribution to public discourse.
Smith's greatest offering in this book lies in his polemical demoli
tion of the standard rhetoric of campaign-finance reform. He makes
mincemeat of the foggy complaint that "campaign spending is too
high" (p. 41), showing that Americans spend "two to three times as
much money each year on the purchase of potato chips," and that
Philip Morris and Procter & Gamble "spend roughly the same amount
on advertising as is spent by all political parties and candidates" (p.
42). He makes a good case that as a society, we spend too little money
on political communication and campaigning, a point we must keep in
mind (p. 45).
Smith also debunks the claim that "money buys elections," point
ing to dozens of congressional campaigns where the lesser-financed
candidate won, and arguing that the normally high correlation
between campaign spending and victory is more likely to reflect the
popularity of the winning candidate than to create it (pp. 48-51).
Although Smith does not mention it, Rob Richie and the Center for
Voting and Democracy have forcefully documented that campaign
funding is a substantially less-important factor in general election
victory in congressional races than the engineered partisan and
demographic makeup of legislative districts.9 If you give major-party
congressional nominees the choice between having a favorably gerry
mandered district and a fundraising disadvantage, or an unfavorably
gerrymandered district and a fundraising advantage, all the smart ones
will choose the former. (Of course, most incumbents are able to get
both.)
Grabbing the bull by the horns, Smith attacks the assumption that
"[m]oney is a corrupting influence on the legislature" (p. 51 ). Here,
corruption cannot mean the "personal enrichment of a legislator in
exchange for a vote" (p. 52), since that kind of dirty dealing is already
proscribed by laws against bribery. Smith asserts "[w]hat reformers
mean by 'corruption' is that legislators react to the wishes of constitu
ents; or what, in other circumstances, might be called 'responsiveness.'
What makes this particular incidence of responsiveness 'corrupt' is
that the constituents involved have taken an active role in supporting
the candidate's campaign for election" with money contributions (p.
52). Smith illustrates what he sees as the reformers' fallacy by citing a
Common Cause bulletin reporting $14.2 million in campaign contribu-

9. See Rob Richie, Money Doesn't Buy Love - Nor Most Elections, ROLL CALL (D.C.),
July 21, 1997 (concluding that partisan politics ultimately proves more decisive in winning
votes than the size of campaign expenditures), available at http://www.fairvote.org/reports/
monopoly/richie2.html (last visited May 30, 2003).

1536

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:1532

tions from the "sugar and peanut industries" over several elections.1 0
But, Smith argues, this evidence is meaningless with respect to corrup
tion because "[n]o effort is made to show that any congressman or
senator, let alone a majority, voted against his conscience or the
wishes of his constituency in exchange for votes on the issue" (p. 53).
(I think he actually meant to write "in exchange for campaign contri
butions." )
Smith is correct that if corruption simply means compromising the
moral purity or "true beliefs" of the politician, then the claim that
money corrupts legislatures seems highly doubtful. The kinds of politi
cians that receive huge sums from agri-business interests are the kinds
of politicians that would robotically serve these interests anyway.
Corporate power does not have to buy politicians in American elec
tions; it spawns them. Thus, although Smith fails to provide us with a
definition of corruption, we need a definition that does not focus on
the impressionable soul of the politician but rather on keeping the
channels of popular democracy safe from capture by predatory elite
factions, which are always made up of both politicians and the broader
interests they serve.
After tracking the "faulty assumptions of campaign finance
reform," Smith argues that past reforms have "actually exacerbated
many of the problems they were intended to solve, and created new
problems along the way" (p. 65). This is the familiar conservative
argument of "perversity": that the effects of any well-intended reform
will j ust make matters worse. Here Smith is not nearly so convincing.
In the first place, he ignores important structural reforms of the past,
notably the federal-statutory ban beginning in 1907 with the Tillman
Act on any contributions from corporation treasuries directly to can
didate campaign treasuries.11
Smith's silence on the Tillman Act is eerie. Does he favor such a
ban on corporate contributions to federal candidates or does he
oppose it? Has this ban succeeded in breaking the cash nexus between
the for-profit corporate sector and legislative politics? Is this a permis
sible and desirable goal? Although he explores and attacks practically
every other campaign-finance regulation, he tiptoes around this one. If
corporations have the political free-speech rights of citizens, surely
this policy collides with Smith's free-speech principle. While he quite
amazingly takes issue with the Court's democracy-reinforcing decision
in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,12 which affirmed a
10. See Pocketbook Politics, COMMON CAUSE, Feb. 24, 1998 (summarizing campaign
contributions from various special-interest groups), available at http://www.commoncause.
org/pressroom/profiles.html (last visited May 30, 2003).
11. See Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2003)).
12. P. 150; Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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Michigan law forbidding corporate-treasury expenditures on candi
date races, he does not tell us what he thinks of the Tillman Act's ban
on direct corporate-treasury contributions to candidate campaigns.
Smith's shyness about this fundamental problem may have been born
of his ambitions to serve on the FEC, but perhaps it reflects an
unwillingness to follow his libertarian rhetoric to its logical conclusion:
if corporations are political citizens, then they should be able to give
on an unlimited basis not j ust to initiative and referendum campaigns
but directly to candidates as well.
This would be a most revealing confession on his part if he would
own up to it, for it is clear that an unhampered "corporate democracy"
is the kind of society conservative libertarians have in mind. Smith
himself likens inequalities in political wealth and media power to the
distribution of natural talents and attributes in society: "There are a
great many sources of political influence. These include direct
personal attributes, such as speaking and writing ability, good looks,
personality, time and energy, and organizational skills, as well as
acquired attributes, such as wealth, celebrity, and access to or control
of the popular press" (p. 1 077). We are thus implicitly invited to
humanize corporations, naturalize their wealth and power, and consti
tutionalize their right to participate in politics.
Yet, unwilling to follow the logic of his argument all the way to
lifting the ban on corporate contributions to candidates, Smith instead
stacks up unconvincing policy arguments against reforms past and
present. Focusing on the 1 974 amendments to the 1 971 Federal
Election Campaign Act,13 he argues that contribution limits, like the
$1,000 limit on giving to candidates for Congress, "favor incumbents
by making it relatively harder for challengers to raise money and
thereby make credible runs for office" (p. 66). This claim is deeply
suspect since incumbents have overwhelmingly disproportionate
access to large givers, which means that contribution limits will tend to
even things out a bit. Now that the $1,000 giving limit has been lifted
to $2,000 with McCain-Feingold1 4 for example, incumbents are able to
rake in large numbers of $2,000 checks where their prior sums were
half of that. Smith may have in mind certain Republican challengers to
Democratic incumbents who would like to be able to draw on several
$100,000 contributors. But contribution limits obviously help most
challenger candidates marginally close the gap with incumbents, even
though incumbents continue to enjoy extraordinary fundraising advan-

13. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (1974) (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225m, 86
Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (2003))).
14. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441 a(a)(l).
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tages.15 Lifting contribution limits would, on the whole, make matters
worse for challengers and better for incumbents who have broad
access to big donors and vast amounts of highly motivated special
interest money.
Many of Smith's other claims about the consequences of past
reform are equally doubtful: that reform has "inhibited the robust
discussion of public issues" (p. 73), or that it has "promoted influence
peddling, reduced legislative accountability, and caused dereliction of
duty" (p. 76). The basis for this latter set of claims is that, by forcing
candidates to collect contributions in tiny $1,000 morsels rather than
in, say, efficiently satisfying $250,000 chunks, the candidates must
"divert the legislative attention away from official duties and toward
fundraising" (p. 78). The need to impress so many different donors,
Smith assert s, sounding suddenly like a Common Cause lobbyist, also
reduces the willingness of officials to take prudent risks: it "promote[s]
shirking by increasing the pressure on legislators not to offend
contributors" (p. 78).
Ironically, the interests that Smith invokes in saving legislators'
time for actual legislation make a much better fit for arguments on
behalf of public financing that Smith cavalierly rejects elsewhere in his
book. These points make hollow arguments for getting rid of contribu
tion limits, however, since big donors will demand much more time
from legislators and can themselves - at least on an individual basis
- increase the "pressure on legislators not to offend" (p. 78). In any
event, legislators will not pass up the opportunity to make the $1,000
calls j ust because a $5,000 check has already arrived! It is nearly im
possible for anyone with even passing familiarity with politics in the
real world to believe that raising contribution limits will reduce the
amount of time the ordinary politician spends on fundraising.
One perverse effect of 1970s reform correctly identified by Smith is
the way the reforms propelled "the phenomenon of the 'millionaire
candidate' - Donald Trump, John Corzine, Ross Perot, and Steve
Forbes" (p. 70). Since the Court in Buckley v. Valeo upheld the $1,000
campaign-contribution limit16 but struck down all limits on what a
candidate could spend on his or her own campaign from personal
funds,17 millionaires like Michael Huffington, Herb Kohl, or Jay
Rockefeller have automatically become "viable candidate[s] precisely

15. See, e.g., Common Cause, Reporter's Guide to Money in Politics Campaign 2000:
Incumbent Advantage, at http://www.commoncause.org/pressroom/congress_advantage.html
(last visited May 30, 2003) (concluding that incumbents benefit from a marked funding ad
vantage).
1 6. 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (per curiam).
17.

Buckley,

424 U.S. at 52.
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because personal wealth provides a direct campaign advantage that
cannot be offset by a large contributor to the opposing candidate" (p.

70).

Smith is not actually troubled by the broad plutocratic implications
of this development, the idea that we may be drifting into de facto
wealth and property qualifications - not for voting but for running
for public office. What troubles him is that the politically active
billionaire is constrained in his or her options. "Ross Perot's 1992
presidential campaign was possible because Perot was able to spend
millions to advance his own candidacy. However,· the contribution
limits upheld in Buckley made it illegal for Perot to bankroll the
campaign of a more plausible challenger, such as General Colin
Powell" (p. 70). Similarly, Smith is up in arms about the case of "mil
lionaire publisher Malcolm S. 'Steve' Forbes, Jr., a political neophyte"
and candidate for the Republican nomination for president in 1996
who

indicated that he would not have sought the nomination had former con
gressman and secretary of housing and urban development Jack Kemp
decided to run . . . . Had Forbes been able to donate to Kemp the $25
million he planned to spend -on his own campaign, Kemp might have run
and would quite likely have been a frontrunner for the Republican
nomination. (p. 71)
Smith recognizes that millionaires have achieved a central place of
honor in the current regime. Nonetheless, he invites us to believe that
the principal injury inflicted by this system is to their disappointed
close friends who should enjoy unfettered access to these private
millions as well.
But what about everyone else? Can our circle of democratic empa
thy extend beyond the class of people that includes Colin Powell and
Jack Kemp (not billionaires, it is true, but certainly millionaires)?
What about those Americans who have something meaningful to con
tribute in politics but have neither millions of dollars nor generous
close friends with billions in the bank?
In truth, the question of how this or that reform affects our politics
is rhetorical window dressing for Smith. The beating, if sometimes
muffled, heart of his book is a categorical and absolutist First
Amendment defense of the unlimited right to give and spend private
money in politics. Thus, Smith does not care that most money in cam
paigns comes from a rich elite, less than one-tenth of one percent of
the people,18 or that 90% of the American people do not participate in
fundraising at all (p. 74). It is of no serious moment to him whether
incumbents are benefited or hurt, whether elections are competitive or
not, or whether politics is open to the vast many or the well-heeled

18. ACKERMAN& AY RES, p.

31.
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few. The key point is that anyone should be able to give as much
money to any candidate or group as he or she wishes, and every
candidate should be able to spend whatever liquid capital he or she
has in order to win. Smith deduces this principle from the First
Amendment (pp. 137-66) and understands it as inescapable regardless
of its worldly consequences.
Smith grounds this principle in the prevailing free-speech theory of
money in politics (pp. 137-66). He endorses the Buckley v. Valeo
majority's across-the-board invalidation of spending limits as a "direct
quantity restriction"19 on political speech. He castigates the Court for
validating $ 1 ,000 contribution limits in the interest of fighting "corrup
tion and the appearance of corruption" (p. 33). Smith challenges
Judge J. Skelly Wright's opinion in the appeals court ruling in Buckley
that "nothing in the First Amendment commits us to the dogma that
money is speech."20 "If spending money were not a form of speech,"
Smith writes, "the First Amendment would become hollow for all but
newspapers and other press outlets, since any effort to spread one's
message, through advertising or pamphleteering, could be stripped of
First Amendment protections simply by attacking the expenditure of
money" (p. 113). Indeed, even with respect to newspapers, as Smith
recognizes, the Supreme Court found in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan that the purchase and sale of newspaper ad space constituted
First Amendment protected actions.21 Thus, even if money is not actu
ally speech - even if it is best seen as "property," as Justice Stevens
argued powerfully in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC22
it is still a kind of fungible property practically indispensable to the
effectuation of speech and press activity in modern society. Without a
free market in political money, Smith suggests, there will be no free
market in political speech.
With this market principle as his lodestar, Smith tells us it "is not
exaggeration to say that campaign-finance 'reform' poses the greatest
threat to free speech in America since the Alien and Sedition Acts two
hundred years ago" (p. 87). In actuality that is an exaggeration and
quite an unsettling one. Does Professor Smith forget the Palmer
Raids, the prosecution of socialists and anarchists for opposing World
War I, the incarceration of dissenters for dishonoring the American
flag, the internment of Japanese Americans and foreign nationals
during World War II, McCarthyism and Smith Act prosecutions and
government witch hunts, the massive FBI surveillance and disruption
-

19.

Buckley, 424

U.S. at 18.

20. P. 112 (quoting J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitlltion: Is
YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
22. 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).

Money Speech?,
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of the Civil Rights Movement, Cointelpro and the sweeping prosecu
tions and jailings of antiwar activists during the Vietnam period? Is it
plausible that the "greatest threat to free speech in America since the
Alien and Sedition Acts" is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2001? What does Professor Smith make of the USA PATRIOT Act,
passed in the same year?23 One can well grasp the temptation experi
enced by Professor Smith to assert the martyrdom of those newly
minted civil libertarians courageously defending the free-speech rights
of large corporations and millionaires, but let us not press a good joke
too far.
Leave aside the hyperbole that treats denying Philip Morris the
right to buy j umbo-shrimp hospitality suites at the major-party
national conventions as a greater assault on liberty than, say, sending
presidential candidate Eugene Debs to a federal penitentiary for ten
years for opposing World War I.24 In a formal doctrinal sense, the
BCRA is not targeted at particular political-speech content, much less
specific viewpoints, and any speech forbidden by way of the soft
money ban can be easily effectuated through the expenditure of hard
money by individuals. So our most important First Amendment
warning signals are simply not flashing.
At the same time, the conservative majority on the Court is likely
to strike down the new "soft money" and "electioneering communica
tions" provisions, as well as the provisions barring minors from
making any federal contributions. The constitutional calculus involved
in these issues is massively intricate, but the basic posture of the
Court's ruling majority will be clear: Buckley25 and Shrink PAC26
delineate the outer bounds of campaign-finance regulation to protect
against quid pro quo corruption (and its appearance). Therefore,
Congress cannot regulate political expression by corporations, unions,
political parties, or individuals that does not involve either express
advocacy or a direct candidate contribution. Yet, the major provisions
of the BCRA sweep well beyond this understanding. This is likely to
23. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act"), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 411(a), 1 1 5 Stat. 272, 346 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). For discussion
of the USA PATRIOT Act's impact on free speech and other Bill of Rights guarantees, see
John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Se
curity": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PA TR/OT Act and the Justice Department's
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1096 (2002) (noting the USA PATRIOT

Act's "deleterious effect on the sacrosanct protection of the First Amendment right to free
speech").
24. See RAY G INGER, THEBENDING CROSS: A BIOGRAPHY OF EUGENE VICTORDEBS
(Russell & Russell 1969) ( 1949). See generally EUGENE VICTORDEBS, W ALLS AND BARS
18-39 (Patterson Smith Publishing Corp. 1973) (1927) (recounting autobiographical experi
ences in three county jails, the state penitentiary, and federal prison).
25. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
26. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
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be the conservative Court majority's reaction, and it makes sense
within this conceptual framework.
THE CORPORATION AND CAMPAIGN-FINANCE LAW

But something critical is missing from Smith's approach to the
BCRA's ban on soft-money contributions to political parties. Indeed,
the theoretical omission that permeates Smith's book is that there is
no serious reckoning with the private corporation and what its proper
role should be in federal and state political campaign activity.
If private corporations chartered for economic purposes are consti
tutionally protected political actors like citizens, as Smith repeatedly
assumes, then it makes sense to describe a ban on their "issue ads"
sixty days before an election as blatant interference with political free
speech. If private corporations enjoy the same free-speech rights as
membership associations like environmental groups, gun-owners' or
ganizations, and unions, then it makes sense to treat the ban Oll' their
soft-money contributions to political parties as interference with the
formation of mutual political associations among citizens, as the anti
BCRA plaintiffs allege.27 If the corporation is guaranteed the right to
be an equal participant in elections like individual voters, the leading
features of the BCRA surely must fail.
But Smith's unreflective assimilation of private corporations into
democratic politics cuts against strong currents in American political
and constitutional thought, even among conservatives whose views on
contribution and expenditure limits Smith otherwise applauds. The
democratic state charters the private corporation to engage in
economic activity that produces private wealth for the benefit ·of
the common good. But the corporation is neither a natural-born nor
naturalized democratic citizen; nor is it a membership group of
citizens. It is a capital-ownership structure and legally defined entity
that should enjoy no political rights under the Constitution. It has no
constitutional standing outside of the independent individual rights of
the people involved with it.
To be sure, Smith's unthinking assumptions about corporations
mirror the state of our procorporatist constitutional law. In First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court in 1978 struck
down a Massachusetts law making it a crime for banks or business
corporations to make political contributions or independent expendi
tures to influence "the vote on any question submitted to the voters,
other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or

27. See Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell et al. at 25-31,
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 123 S. Ct. 2071 (2003). (No. 02-1 674 et al.) (alleging
that Title I of the BCRA burdens significant speech and associational rights), available at
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-34.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
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assets of the corporation. "28 The statute, passed out of frustration with
corporate spending to defeat initiatives favoring progressive income
taxes, defined initiatives respecting individual income taxes as
categorically not affecting the interests of banks and corporations.29
The Massachusetts legislature would have better focused our attention
on the underlying problem by categorically banning all corporate
initiative spending and contributions, but its legislation activated the
constitutional struggle nonetheless.
The parties to the case, the First National Bank and the Common
wealth of Massachusetts, battled over whether corporations and banks
have First Amendment rights to spend and give money in campaigns,
a right that the Court had upheld with respect to persons two years
before in Buckley v. Valeo.30 But the Court refused to explicitly decide
whether corporations have First Amendment rights.31 It instead
focused on whether the proposed speech itself was protected. Justice
Powell wrote:

The speech proposed by appellants is at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection . ...If the speakers here were not corporations,
no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech.
It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,
and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation
rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of
its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
its source, whether corporations, association, union, or individual.32
Justice Powell's move was pure metaphysics. Speech does not exist in
the abstract, waiting for the right m9ment to express itself. Speech has
an irreducible material basis in the speaker, without whom the speech
would not have content, meaning, or existence. So the whole issue was
precisely whether corporations chartered by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts had a First Amendment right, in explicit opposition to
Massachusetts law, to spend money from corporate treasuries to influ
ence ballot-question campaigns. Recall that there was nothing in state
law stopping individual corporate and bank executives, shareholders,
or directors from expressing their personal views hostile to the
progressive-income-tax initiative and spending their own money to try
and stop it.33 The issue was whether they could take corporate-treasury
money out of the till and spend it for these electoral purposes.

28. 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1977)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
29.

See id.

30. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
31.

Bellotti,

32.

Id.

at 776-77 (internal footnotes omitted).

33.

Id.

at 787-88.

435 U.S. at 776.
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Since the speech affected was of the highest value, the Court
applied strict scrutiny to the state's two suggested interests. The first
interest suggested by Massachusetts was protecting democracy itself.
The Court agreed that "[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral
process, preventing corruption, and 'sustain[ing] the active, alert
responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise
conduct of government' are interests of the highest importance."34
But the problem with the state's democracy argument was that it
depended on the assumption that corporate spending "would exert an
undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote, and - in the
end - destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process
and the integrity of government."35 If these fears "were supported by
record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened im
minently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating
rather than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would
merit our consideration,"36 the majority stated. But "there has been no
showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming
or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that
there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in gov
ernment. "37
This analysis left open the possibility that states could indeed ban
corporate spending in campaigns if they showed that the corporate
voice was "overwhelming" or even "significant," and threatened
popular democracy.38 But the Court then quickly, and paradoxically,
observed that: "To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the
outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advo
cacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it. "39
This reasoning is, of course, incoherent. The Court says at once
that corporate speech might lose protection if it were to become at
some point too effective and overwhelming, and then in the next
breath, that its effectiveness could not be the basis for regulating it.40
Which is it?
The majority's embarrassing confusion on this point follows from
its own persistent refusal to reckon seriously with what a corporation
actually is.41 This failure becomes glaring in its consideration of the
34. Id. at 788-89 (quoting United States
(alteration in original)).
35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

Id.

See id.

39.

Id.
Id.

Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957)

at 789.

38.
40.

v.

at 789-90 (internal footnote omitted).
at 790.

41. See generally Carl J.
of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L .J.

Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill
577 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court's treatment of the
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second major interest invoked by Massachusetts to defend its law: its
interest in "protecting the rights of shareholders whose views differ
from those expressed by management on behalf of the corporation."42
The majority rejected this alleged interest in protecting dissenting
shareholders because the statute was "both underinclusive and overin
clusive" for these purposes.43 The law did not go far enough because it
tolerated corporate lobbying to defeat or pass state legislation that
certain shareholders might also disagree about and it did not ban cor
porate spending on public issues that were not the subject of a public
referendum.44 It also failed to target other associations such as unions
and business trusts for the same treatment. Conversely, it swept too
far because it prohibited "a corporation from supporting or opposing a
referendum proposal even if its shareholders unanimously authorized
the contribution or expenditure."45 Justice Powell noted that share
holders who truly object can use the "procedures of corporate democ
racy" to register their dissent or can bring a "derivative suit to chal
lenge corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for
improper corporate purposes."46
Justice White, in his superb dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, framed the issue as "whether a State may
prevent corporate management from using the corporate treasury to
propagate views having no connection with the corporate business."47
He invoked the traditional " artificial entity" view of the corporation,
an understanding that goes all the way back to conservative Chief
Justice John Marshall:

Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of fur
thering certain economic goals. In order to facilitate the achievement of
such ends, special rules relating to such matters as limited liability, per
petual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets are
normally applied to them. States have provided corporations with such
attributes in order to increase their economic viability and thus
strengthen the economy generally. 48
But Justice White pointed out the danger that these desirable eco
nomic advantages could be converted into tyrannical political power,
which could, in turn, be used to perpetuate special privileges for the

personhood of corporations has been erratic and unsystematic, though tilting in a procorpo
rate direction).
42.

Bellotti, 435

U.S. at 787.

43. Id. at 793.
44. Id. at 793-94.
45. Id. at 794.
46. Id. at 794.
47. Id. at 803 (White, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
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corporate class: "It has long been recognized . . . that the special status
of corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts
of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the
economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral proc
ess."49 Justice White conceded that Buckley v. Valeo rejected any
public interest in "equaliz[ing] the financial resources available to
candidates," but argued that Massachusetts's interest was quite differ
ent from mere equality:

It is not one of equalizing the resources of opposing candidates or op
posing positions, but rather of preventing institutions which have been
permitted to amass wealth as a result of special advantages extended by
the State for certain economic purposes from using that wealth to ac
quire an unfair advantage in the political process, especially where, as
here, the issue involved has no material connection with the business of
the corporation. The State need not permit its own creation to consume it.
Massachusetts could permissibly conclude that not to impose limits upon
the political activities of corporations would have placed it in a position
of departing from neutrality and indirectly assisting the propagation of
corporate views because of the advantages its laws give to the corporate
acquisition of funds to finance such activities. 50
The only problem with Justice White's opinion was that he character
ized the state's democratic insistence on abolishing corporate influ
ence over elections as a social "interest" to be weighed against corpo
rate free-speech rights, rather than a logically prior definitional
principle that corporations are not citizens.
In his own fine dissent, Justice Rehnquist evinced his (one hopes)
imperishable understanding of that point. To begin with, he seemed to
doubt the solidity of the Supreme Court's 1886 decision, declaring the
business corporation is a "person" within the meaning of Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection.51 He emphasized Chief Justice John
Marshall's statement in the Dartmouth College case that a "corpora
tion is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence."52 While Justice
Rehnquist correctly defended the Court's prior findings that chartered
media corporations have First Amendment freedoms and all proper
tied corporations have a right not to have their property confiscated
without due process of law, he strongly doubted whether ordinary
business corporations should be construed to have constitutionally
49. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 809-10 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 823 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 823 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Dartmouth Coll.
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

v.

Woodward, 17
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protected political rights. He could not see why "liberties of political
expression" are "necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States
permit commercial corporations to exist . . . . Indeed, the States might
reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic power to
obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed."53
Justice Rehnquist and the other dissenters thus had a much
stronger hold on what a corporation really is and how we conceive of
its role in our politics. After all, Congress categorically banned corpo
rate contributions in federal election campaigns in 1907 in the Tillman
Act,54 a prohibition that has been an uncontroversial mainstay in fed
eral law ever since. If it is the case that the political speech that corpo
rations want to promote in ballot-issue campaigns is constitutionally
protected, as the majority determined in Bellotti55 and as Smith clearly
believes, it is hard to see why the long-standing ban on direct corpo
rate contributions to federal candidates is constitutional. It cannot be
because an unusual danger of quid pro quo corruption exists within
the meaning of Buckley v. Valeo.56 After all, if a reasonable limitation
of $1,000 suffices to regulate "the reality or appearance of corrup
tion"57 for. individual contributions, why not corporate ones? Why
shouldn't corporate CEOs be allowed to write $1,000 checks pardon me, $2,000 checks, or actually in Smith's utopia, unlimited
checks - to federal candidates right out .of their company treasuries
whenever the spirit moves them? I do not think that Smith can explain
what would be constitutionally wrong with this practice. Indeed, I
suppose he figures nothing is.
For those who still have some lingering democratic pride and resis
tance to corporate aristocracy, the best explanation for our opposition
to corporate intervention in politics is within the legislative history of
the 1907 Tillman Act. Adam Winkler has written a fine article
. explaining that, contrary to received wisdom, the "primary purpose of
the ban on corporate campaign contributions" in the Tillman Act and
parallel state laws was not to limit corporate political power generally,
but more specifically "to prevent corporate managers from using
stockholders' money to finance electoral politics."58 Winkler associates
the extraordinary early twentieth-century political controversy over
corporate and insurance company campaign contributions with the
53. Id. at 826 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
54. Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended at 2
(2003)).

u.s.c. § 441(b)

55.

Bellotti,

435 U.S. 765 (1978).

56. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 48.
58. Adam Winkler, Corporate Contribution Bans and the Separation of Ownership and
Control in the Early Twentieth Century 1 -2 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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profound anxieties caused by "the separation of ownership and
control" in the modern corporation.59 Political reformers of the time
"sought to ban corporate contributions primarily because such contri"
butions were seen to be a serious misuse of 'other people's money.' "60
The "political danger of corporate campaign financing" was not so
much to the rest of democratic society but "to the members within the
corporate organization, in particular the stockholders."61 It was their
money being used, without their consent or knowledge, often against
their own political interests, positions, and values.
Winkler relates how several celebrated cases of life-insurance
companies secretly pouring corporate-treasury funds into national
Republican Party political campaigns provoked public outrage.62 The
scandal of a New York life-insurance company corruption led to an
investigation by the New York legislature's Armstrong Committee
that, according to Upton Sinclair, "shook the nation to its depths."63
The investigation revealed a pattern of corporate managers taking the
money of "widows and orphans"64 out of corporate treasuries to
bankroll politicians who wrote laws to entrench the managers' own
power in the corporation. According to the Nation, the Armstrong
investigation - which would propel a little-known corporate lawyer
and law professor named Charles Evan Hughes to the governorship of
New York and ultimately a seat on the Supreme Court - focused on
"the corrupt alliance of insurance companies with great speculators
and powerful politicians. "65 In the Tillman Act and similar state laws,
the nation resolved to stop corporate managers from using "other
people's money" - "the money ... stolen from men and women who
toiled and slaved and saved pennies to pay premiums"66 - to advance
the managers' selfish personal and corporate political agendas.
Most Americans instinctively understand the external threat that
corporate wealth and power pose to democratic institutions, but the
closely connected logic of the internal threat to the rights of share
holders and employees has largely escaped us in recent times - at
least until the Enron scandal broke. Perhaps this heart-breaking scan
dal will help us to reunite the external and internal dimensions of this
old-fashioned critique of political participation by corporate execu59.

Id.

60.

Id.

6 1.

Id.

62.

Id.

at 2.

at 3.

63. Id. at 31 (quoting UPTON SINCLAIR, THE BRASS CHECK: A STUDY OF AMERICAN
JOURNALISM31 ( 1919 ) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64.

Id.

at 47.

65.

The Week,

81NATION473, 475 (1905 ) .

66.

The Week,

81NATION433, 435 ( 1905 ).
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tives brandishing other people's money. Top executives at Enron
deployed their control over the corporate assets of the shareholders to
spread very large soft-money campaign contributions around both
political parties.67 Top Enron and Arthur Anderson executives also
contributed direct hard money to a large group of key politicians,
including fifty-one out of fifty-six members of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee and forty-nine out of seventy members of the
House Financial Services Committee.68 In the decade before Enron's
collapse, its leaders pumped nearly $6 million into federal campaigns
and the two-party system to guarantee the ideology of energy "
deregulation." 69
The corporate managers' resulting political influence in Congress
and in the Republican Party, which went all the way to President
George W. Bush and the White House,70 shielded them from meaning
ful official scrutiny and allowed them to entrench their power with
respect to the shareholders. Enron executives thus used other people's
money to enrich themselves beyond belief and to ingratiate them
selves with politicians to insulate their lawless power from public
accountability. When the company ultimately went bankrupt, the
shareholders, many of them Enron employees, saw their life savings
shrivel and vanish.
If anything positive can come from this disaster and the crime
sweeping corporate America, it will be a recognition that the BCRA's
total ban on corporate soft-money contributions to national or state
political parties, political committees, or candidates71 is constitutional
because corporations do not have political rights under the Constitu
tion. What is at stake is not j ust the rights of "dissenting sharehold
ers," for this phrase trivializes the structural transgression. Dissenting
or not, citizen-shareholders in democratically chartered corporations
have a right not to have their money put to the management's partisan
political uses. The rest of us have a corresponding right not to have the
corporation - which is endowed with so many government blessings
- exploited by incumbent managers to perpetuate and enlarge their
own power. We also have a right not to give business-expense tax de
ductions for corporate political contributions. What is at stake is the
unjust enrichment and self-aggrandizement of a class of corporate
managers determined to use "other people's money" to buy them
selves greater power and freedom from public oversight and account
ability.

67.

See

Robert L. Borosage, Enron Conservatives,NATION, Feb. 4, 2002, at 4.

68.

See The Great Recusal,

69.

See

70.

See id.

AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 25, 2002, at 2.

Center for Responsive Politics, Enron and Anderson, at http://www.opensecrets.
org/news/enron/index.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
71. See

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 44 1(i) (2003).
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Bellotti72 should be overruled, and Professor Smith should use his
analytical gifts to focus on the question of whether corporations have a
constitutional right to give money contributions to candidate cam
paigns and engage in "express advocacy" on behalf of candidates. If
not, why not? And, if they do not, why should corporations have a
right to spend money on political issue ads to influence the opinions of
civil society or to give massive soft-money donations to specific politi
cal parties jockeying against others? Where do these political rights
come from? Smith's equivocation on corporate political rights reflects
a lack of serious reflection about what a corporation is and whether it
makes sense to talk about corporations enjoying the political rights of
citizens.
Smith seems to think that the rest of society must resign itself to
corporate interference in democratic politics because the benefits to
corporations of winning political power and the risks to them of
allowing natural citizens to govern are just too great:
It is simply absurd to think that private actors will ignore rents made
available to them by government action, and even more absurd to think
that individuals or interests will allow the government to tax or regulate
them, sometimes to the point of economic extinction, without attempting
to influence who holds the reigns of power. (p. 194) .
On this view, campaign spending is not some unquantifiably ethereal
shouting in the wind, as Smith often invites us to believe, but a crucial
strategic investment in the political environment.
Must we assume, with Smith, that society is powerless to prevent
political intervention and domination by rent-seeking corporate
"private actors" and "interests"? Is it, in fact, absurd to try to control
the political power of business corporations? Surely corporate
employees, shareholders, and managers may exercise their individual
free-speech rights and spend personal money to promote what they
see as the society's best interests, even if their vision is congruent with
larger corporate political priorities. But it is illogical and perverse that
the officers of publicly chartered corporations should be empowered
to spend corporate-treasury money to tell the larger democratic soci
ety how to govern itself. The progress and integrity of democracy
require a wall of separation between public elections and private
corporations that will be as towering and impenetrable as the "wall of
separation between church and state" advocated by Thomas Jefferson
in his famous 1802 letter to the B aptists of Danbury, Connecticut.73
Indeed, if Professor Smith delved deeper into law-and-economics,
he might even end up with a strong free-market argument on behalf of
public campaign financing. For, as Smith understands, the system of

72. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
73. THOMASJEF F ERSON, W RITING S 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1 984).
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private and corporate fundraising invites massive rent-seeking by
private interests that figure out that well-invested millions in the
campaign cycle can produce hundreds of millions or billions of dollars
in return public policy benefits, either in the form of tax breaks or
direct state subsidies. Thus, the true champion of an undistorted mar
ket economy should seek to oust rent-seeking strategic players in the
campaign-finance game and liberate public officials from that kind of
irrational .influence and power. Conservatives like to say, with Smith,
that corporate rent-seeking is the product of .a large government as if
corporations themselves were not directly involved in the expansion of
the size and scope of government. This contradicts everything we
know about the central role of corporations in driving the growth of
the American state.
The wall of separation between corporations and public elections
is something we already insist upon when it comes to munidpal corpo
rations. In a revealing case called Anderson v. City of Boston,74 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1978 stopped the city of
Boston from spending money to support a campaign for a progressive
taxation "classification" proposal that was on a statewide referendum
election ballot. Significantly, the municipal corporation of Boston was
spending this money in direct opposition to private corporations
which, in exercise of their Bellotti rights, were spending money to
oppose the measure. The Anderson court speculated that "the First
Amendment has nothing to do with this intra-state question of the
rights of a political subdivision. "75 Yet, even assuming that this kind of
municipal-corporate political speech was presumptively protected, the
court found that Boston, Massachusetts had shown a "compelling
interest in assuring the fairness of elections and the appearance of
fairness in the electoral process," which justified its implicit ban on
municipal expenditures in a referendum campaign.76 The court empha
sized how fairness was advanced by keeping the city from "using
public tax revenues to advocate a position which certain taxpayers
oppose,"77 precisely the interest that the Bellotti Court dismissed when
it came to private shareholders.78 The Anderson court characterized
Boston's view as suggesting that "the Commonwealth is apparently
powerless against political entities of its own creation," precisely the
terms in which Justice White castigated the argument made by private
corporations and banks in Bellotti.79
74. 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978).
75.

Anderson,

76.

Id. at 638.

77.

Id. at 639.

380 N.E.2d at 637.

78. First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
79.
ing).

Anderson,

380 N.E.2d at 639; see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-10 (White, J., dissent
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The current state of the law leaves us with an indefensible asym
metry: private-corporate managers can spend to the heavens in pursuit
of their political objectives while municipal corporations can spend
nothing even if, as in the Anderson case, the elected representatives of
the people on the city council overwhelmingly authorize and approve
it. This imbalance swells the power of private corporations, leaving
municipal corporations at their mercy. It probably makes sense to
view municipal corporations as without free-speech rights since they
are artificial entities that should effectuate the public will rather than
try to shape it. On the other hand, in a statewide election, if private
corporations are going to campaign for or against ballot issues and
spend other people's money (almost always without their knowledge
or consent) on such a campaign, then surely cities or towns with spe
cific regional and political commitments should be able to make the
parallel choice. In fact, the argument in support of municipal corpora
tions is even more compelling, since democratic accountability is much
stronger in localities and their participation is badly needed to coun
teract the political power of private corporations. But the cleanest
solution would be for the Court to recognize that no corporation,
public or private, has a constitutionally protected right to spend or
contribute money in electoral politics.
To be sure, the BCRA's ban on union and individual soft-money
contributions to political parties is probably unconstitutional. Unions
are j ust democratically governed groups of citizens who put their own
money into the union treasury for common political purposes. When
they want to spend money to promote political party-building activi
ties, political education or get-out-the-vote drives, they are not con
verting anyone else's money into their own political power nor are
they exploiting a socially created capital-accumulation vehicle for
illegitimate political purposes. The ubiquitous but intellectually lazy
linkage of unions with corporations, both in law and in scholarship like
Smith's (p. 28), reflects a cheap moral and political equivalency that
has prevailed at least since the time of the Taft-Hartley Act.80 Unions
are membership organizations whose members associate for the
purpose of exercising their First Amendment political rights. Corpora
tions are ownership structures that do not have members but share
holders, employees, and Boards of Directors, all organized into a
closely regulated legal hierarchy for economic purposes.
Smith's apparent lack of appreciation for the historical and social
meaning of corporate power Undermines the utility of his healthy

80. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120, § 304,
61 Stat. 136 (1 947), amended by 1 8 U.S.C. § 610 (1948) (repealed 1976). Current prohibitions
on union contributions to political campaign electioneering are contained in the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441 (b) (2003); see also p. 28 (discussing limitations
on union political contributions in the Smith-Connally Act).
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libertarian instincts. If he at least wrestled conceptually with the
corporation, he could return to assure us that corporations are indeed
functional citizens protected by the First Amendment and deserving of
all of the constitutional political rights that human citizens enjoy. On
this view, the Tillman Act would have to be tossed out along with the
BCRA. Corporations would then become the unquestioned masters of
our politics and government, j ust as they are now the unquestioned
masters of our economy. This would not be any democrat's utopian
fantasy, but there would be a clean logic to it.
Alternatively, Smith might report back that political liberty
belongs to persons, not to state-chartered vehicles of wealth accumula
tion, and that the substantial constitutional protection already ex
tended to corporate political power has been a costly conceptual error
that has serviced not political freedom but inequality and aristocratic
privilege. At that point, we could have a serious discussion about how
to secure the people maximum political liberty while taming the state's
own ravenous creature, in Justice White's clarifying terms.81
Perhaps the best way to do that, given the high costs of media
campaigning, would be to develop a public finance regime based on
reclaiming the public airwaves (at least partially) during election
season for the purpose of providing free air time to federal candidates.
Right now candidates spend more than a billion dollars in a federal
election year buying television- and radio-broadcast time on airwaves
that "we, the people" actually own but stupidly give away to mega
corporations, who charge us for the privilege of engaging in campaign
discourse. But change here has proven terribly difficult because the
broadcast industry is itself extremely powerful. It awards millions of
dollars in campaign contributions to friendly legislators and intimi
dates politicians through its control over the media. Thus, one obvious
cure for corporate domination of our politics - having the people
reclaim our airwaves for political free speech - is being frustrated by
the disease of corporate political power itself.
Yet, Smith sees nothing wrong with the way that our broadcast in
dustry is organized other than the distant threat that political candi
dates will one day get to appear on the air without paying a large cor
poration for the privilege (p. 141). "The network has a right to operate
its property," he insists, apparently perfectly oblivious to the political
origins of this property (p. 141). "To paraphrase the Declaration of
Independence, government is instituted to preserve ·such rights,"
Smith solemnly declares (p. 141). In fact, these corporate "rights" in
the public airwaves only exist because the government created and
currently regulates them. So why should we elevate these delegated
property rights of the broadcast licensee over the political rights of the
81. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J,, dissenting) ("The State need not permit its
own creation to consume it.").
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candidates and voters to have a campaign process with televised free
speech? In a political democracy, it is a matter of unfulfilled common
sense to pass legislation conditioning broadcast licenses on surrender
of substantial time for debates and candidate appearances during the
election season. Smith allows that, as "a philosophical matter, such a
statute may be well and good." But, as "a constitutional matter, it is
exactly what the First Amendment prohibits when free speech is at
stake" (p. 142).
But surely the government is not prevented by the First Amend
ment from saving a certain number of airwave hours for political de
bate when it awards broadcast licenses. Yet, to justify precisely this
paradoxical position, Smith invokes a series of judicial decisions up
holding the exclusion of third party and independent candidates from
candidate debates sponsored by public television networks (p. 142
n.13). No self-respecting champion of free speech should have any
word of praise for j udicial decisions upholding a government practice
that taxes citizens of all views to promote exclusionary television
debates between candidates representing two points of view. This
selective and one-sided conscription of public support for particular
political ideas cuts against our deepest understandings of democratic
liberty. As Thomas Jefferson argued on behalf of his 1779 statute for
religious freedom, "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money
for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors,
is sinful and tyrannical."82 Smith essentially invites us to believe that
if a broadcast entity sponsors a debate between a Democratic and
Republican congressional candidate and freezes out an Independent,
our free-speech sympathies should lie not with the excluded candidate
but with the broadcaster, who logically has the right to have the
Independent arrested if he or she dares to show up.83 Some libertari
anism, some democrat.
Smith also misplaces his libertarian instincts when trying to refute
several arguments that I have made in the past about our state82. T HOM AS J EF F ERSON, J EFF ERSON' S L ITERARY COMM ONPLACE BOOK 41 (Douglas
L . Wilson ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1989) (1928).
83. In the leading case, Arkansas

Education Television Commission v. Forbes,

523 U.S.

666 (1998), a state-run cable channel excluded an Independent candidate for Congress from
a televised debate between his Democratic and Republican rivals. When Forbes showed up
at the station, he was turned away and told the station would rather show reruns of St. Else
where than conduct the debate with him in it. This is now a fairly common scenario, and one
that achieved national attention in 2000 when the Commission on Presidential Debates, a
private corporation, called out Massachusetts State Troopers to threaten Green Party presi
dential candidate Ralph Nader with arrest for showing up at its first George Bush-Al Gore
debate at the University of Massachusetts. See, e.g., Nader Tossed Off Grounds at Debate
Site: Thousands Protest Variety of Issues (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 3, 2003) (reporting
Nader's expulsion from the 2000 Presidential Debate in Boston, where state officers threat
ened him with arrest). For a complete analysis of the lawfulness of debate exclusion by both
state and corporate actors, see Jamin 8. Raskin, The Debate Gerrymander, 77 T EX AS L.
REV. 1943 (1999).
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engineered "wealth primary." In an article I wrote with John Bonifaz,
we argued that Equal Protection compels the government, at a mini
mum, to provide subsidies to challengers equal to the most obviously
political self-subsidies engineered by incumbent members of Congress,
such as the franking privilege, which allows congressional members to
use their official budget for mailings to their constituents,84 taxpayer
funded press secretaries, schedulers, and speechwriters.85 Smith takes
lengthy issue with the suggestion that these extensive government
conferred subsidies and political advantages translate into state action.
He argues: "Finding state action in the mere fact that some people are
officeholders seems a dubious proposition, for it would place state
action at the center of all aspects of public discourse" (p. 1 56). But, of
course, there is state action at the center of public discourse when
incumbent government leaders selectively substitute public resources
for private campaign funds to reach the electorate on behalf of their
own ambitions. As in Terry v. Adams,86 we find in today's wealth pri
mary "an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with state
power . . . [in an] effort to . . . subvert what is formally the law,"87
which here is supposed to be a private competition for funds without
state subsidies. Smith, further, dislikes the argument that proincum
bent state action can be found in the enactment of special-interest
legislation profiting particular donors, which in turn spurs further
contributions to the same incumbents. "This theory raises more
questions than it answers," Smith writes (p. 156), and this certainly is
true. The argument forces us to recognize that we have a mature
political and social system and the only sensible and just way to
organize fair and open campaigns is through a public system.
In the final analysis, Smith leaves us with an effective diatribe
against muddled reformers who think that there is something intrinsi
cally progressive about capping any kind of political campaign giving
and spending we can lay our hands on. But, having gone for this easy
target, Smith does not ask himself the hard questions about the struc
tural place of private corporations in American democracy or the law
fulness of official contrivances favoring incumbents, much less how we
might rearrange things for greater public participation or a more effec
tive exercise of political liberty by citizen�. His book reduces to an
eloquent plea for doing nothing but opposing reform.
·

84. See U.S. House of Representatives, Franking Commission: What is the Frank?, at
http://www.house.gov/cha/franking/what_is_the_frank_/body_what_is_the_frank_.html (last
visited May 30, 2002) (explaining the historical development of the franking privilege since
its introduction to the American Continental Congress in 1775).
85. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz,
L. & PO L' Y REV. 273 (1993).
86. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
87.

Terry, 345

U.S. at 473-74.
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II.
In their intriguing and spirited little manifesto for a massive
voucher solution to the agonies of campaign-finance reform, Bruce
Ackerman and Ian Ayres provide us with what is, at the very least, a
provocative thought experiment about how we might broaden the
circle of political participation to overcome the plutocratic dynamics
of the current regime. Their meticulously detailed multibillion dollar
plan for "patriot dollars" is sweepingly ambitious, gimmicky in parts,
and also sometimes infected with the same ideologically saturated pre
legal-realist romance with "markets" that permeates Smith's work.
But both the book's great virtues and its serious flaws point us in
the direction of a real alternative to the depressing cycle of money
domination and command-and-control regulation that infuses many
recent reform dynamics. For the truly viable alternative today origi
nates - what do you know? - not from conservative or liberal law
professors but from voters in several states who have overcome the
opposition of incumbent politicians to pass by initiative impressively
effective "clean-money" voluntary public finance programs.
Yet, Ackerman and Ayres are not much interested in the clean
money movement that has triumphed in Arizona, Massachusetts,
Maine, and Vermont.88 In these states, legislative candidates who
choose to participate can qualify for a set amount of public funding
(usually pegged to the costs of victory in the last election) by first
raising a certain threshold number of $5 contributions. This system
allows large numbers of people, without regard to their wealth or
poverty, to participate in the seeding of campaigns; it allows candi
dates, once they have qualified for the public funding, to spend time
on campaigning rather than simply fundraising by granting them equal
state subsidies; and it reduces overall the power of big private money
in politics and government. As dictated by Buckley, candidates who
choose to run outside of the public system can continue to raise and
spend private money (under different state contribution limits).89
To Ackerman and Ayres, the clean-money regime smacks of "a
centralized process - replete with heavy-handed requirements that
favor incumbents, entrench existing parties, and alienate citizens from
funding decisions" (p. 3). This unsubstantiated characterization is
deeply at odds with all of the early evidence we have about the fairly
88. See generally Representative Harold E. Ford, Jr. & Jason M. Levien, A New Hori
zon for Campaign Finance Reform, 37 H ARV. J. ON L EG IS. 307 (2000) (highlighting the tri
umph of clean-money ballot initiatives in Maine, Massachusetts, and Arizona); Miles Rapo
port & Jason Tarricone, Election Reform's Next Phase: A Broad Democracy Agenda and the
Need for a Movement, 9 G EO. J. ON POV ERTY L. & POL'Y 379, 398-401 (2002) (showing that
successful clean-money initiatives in Arizona, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts are
promising models for broad democratic reform of our nation's money politics).
89.

See

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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remarkable success of the clean-money reforms, which have substan
tially increased the number of new and outsider candidates, precipi
tated the ouster of large numbers of incumbents, and generally
increased the openness of the political process.90 These successes have
come without the creation of any big, coercive bureaucracy, a driving
fear of the authors. Indeed, the government effort implied by clean
money pales next to their own vision of a renovated and expanded
Federal Election Commission made up of five "retired federal judges"
(p. 129) who name and oversee the heads of three new bureaucratic
divisions assigned with fetchingly complex responsibilities (p. 132).
In any event, the state-based clean-money option is not the federal
plan that the authors promote. Their plan certainly has its own great
virtues - simplicity, unfortunately, not being one of them. The
authors (along with a third collaborator, Danton Berube) experiment
with different numbers, provisions, and requirements along the way,
so perhaps it is best to follow the model statute that they provide at
the end of the book (pp. 181-85).
The central feature of their "$5 billion plus program" (p. 42) is the
introduction of "patriot dollars,'' a guaranteed $50 subsidy that every
American citizen will receive from the government in order to make
federal campaign contributions either to candidates, political action
committees, or political advocacy groups. Once a voter has registered
for a "patriot card" by mail, Internet, at the voting booth, or at the
voter registrar's office, he or she will receive on his or her card four
"subaccounts," including $10 for House elections, $15 for senatorial
elections; and $25 for presidential elections. If, however, there is an
incumbent president seeking reelection, the $25 subaccount is divided
between $10 for the presidential primary and $15 for the general
election (p. 182). All Patriot contributions by citizens must be made
"anonymously" to candidates or political organizations through a
"Blind Trust" set up by the Federal Election Commission (p. 183).
With tens of millions of newly empowered donors, there would be
a huge and salutary influx of new cash for political expression and
millions of new participants in political campaigns, spreading out and
opening up a fundraising system that has grown elitist and self
referential. The authors estimate that, whereas "$3 billion flowed into
the campaign coffers of all aspirants for federal office" in the 2000
elections, "in contrast, $5 billion or so would be coming into the cam
paign through the patriotic system" (p. 7).
Yet, the authors do not wish to use the tidal wave of new patriotic
money to completely oust the system of elite-dominated private con
tributions that constitute our "wealth primary."91 On the contrary,
·90. See Public Campaign, Clean Money Campaign Reform,
paign.org/clean_main.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
91.

See

Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 85.
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they would not only continue the right to give money contributions to
candidates but also would deliberately raise the hard-money private
contribution limits from what they are today under McCain-Feingold,
to what they cheerfully concede is "a stratospheric height that will be
practically insignificant to all but the very richest Americans" (p. 48).
They propose a $100,000 limit for gifts to presidential candidates,
$100,000 for gifts to national political parties during presidential
political cycles, $15,000 for gifts to Senate candidates, and $5,000 for
gifts to House candidates (p. 184). Furthermore, before patriot dolla.rs
even kick in, the authors . would allow federal candidates to raise
money for exploratory funds, including up to $50,000 for House
candidates, $250,000 for Senate candidates, and $1 million for
presidential candidates. Individual donors would be allowed to
contribute up to $2,000, $10,000, and $20,000 to each of these kinds of
funds.
Now, the authors are convinced that dramatic increases in private
giving will not translate into more plutocracy. They keep this faith for
several reasons. The first is the innovation of which they seem most
proud: the "secret donation booth," which emphatically challenges the
standard reform dogma that full contribution disclosure is critical to
democracy (p. 25). Just as voters cast their ballots in secret, Ackerman
and Ayres argue, voters-as-donors should make their contributions
secretly to the FEC's Blind Trust, which will then deposit the contri
butions into designated registered candidate accounts according to
various intricate camouflaging formulae.92 As a matter of course, the
Commission will keep secret the information of who gave how much
to whom. But if "a contributor requests, the Blind Trust will publicly
disclose the amount the contributor has given up to $200" (p. 1 83).
But the records of large donations are not published - that is, until
they are all made public ten years after the fact (an interval that
perhaps shows a naive lack of faith in the longevity of grudges
harbored by American politicians).
Furthermore, the authors have devised an intricate "secrecy
algorithm," found in Appendix B (pp. 227-31), to disguise all contribu
tions through manipulation of the timing and amounts of the FEC's
release of donated money into the blind trusts. Even if a donor
literally shows a candidate a cancelled check he wrote to the Blind
Trust earmarked to the candidate's campaign for $5,000, this too is to
no avail, according to the authors. For they have cleverly provided

92.

For example, if

the Blind Trust receives an unusually large amount of contributions from an unusually con
centrated number of donors, it will report only a randomized amount of contributions
(ranging from one standard deviation below to two standard deviations above the mean
daily receipts) and will attribute excess amounts over a ten-day period.

P. 183.
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that any contributor may rescind any contribution "within five days"
of making it or may "instruct the Blind Trust in advance to send a re
fund check" even if the check is cashed (p. 183). Since sneaky faux
donors will trick politicians, there will be "a regime of cheap talk" (p.
28) and no candidate can ever be absolutely sure that any person actu
ally made a contribution over $200.
What are we to make of this delightful proposal? Its virtues are
plain. Patriot dollars will "invite millions to take a small but active role
throughout the election campaign" (p. 15). Patriot donors "will be
giving renewed social meaning to their self-understanding as free and
equal citizens, engaging in democratic deliberation" (p. 15). This "citi
zenship effect" will engender an "agenda effect" as "candidates and
political organizations will soon learn that they need not rely on the
small elite of private-money donors but can · finance themselves
through broad-based appeals to the patriotic citizenry" (p. 15). It
could actually make possible the development of new political forma
tions, networks, and perhaps even parties.
Furthermore, through various complex-trigger mechanisms, the
plan guarantees that patriot dollars will always represent two-thirds of
total campaign giving, even with the proposed lifting of limits on
private giving, so that the impact of private contributions is contained
(p. 51 ). Since private wealth in politics has recently dominated the
public agenda and national budgetary priorities, reducing private
fundraising to a minority portion of total campaign funds can begin to
emancipate the public to choose new policy directions.
But, as with Smith, there are significant unstated assumptions in
the argument, and vexing unanswered questions. To begin with, it is
not at all clear that the seemingly inspired secret "donation booth"
addresses the real problem of corruption in the political process: The
authors proceed on the premise that corruption follows mainly from
politicians receiving large gifts from individual donors and knowing
the identity of these donors. The painfully elaborate time-release
camouflage mechanism in their "donation booth" scheme is designed
to sow doubt and confusion as to whether someone is really giving
cash to a candidate. But their assumption is that most contributions
come from arms-length relationships among strategic political inves
tors. This is problematic, for many campaign investors are deeply and
organically rooted as political allies, fundraisers, compatriots, and
friends of the politicians they support. Thus, while there may be a sly
trickster here and there who fools a politician into thinking he gave
when he really did not, the vast majority of big donors will caucus with
politicians, party with them, and strategize together for victory. They
have no interest in tricking their endorsed politicians by secretly with
holding their money since they want to see them win. Most donors
share thick ideological, class, and professional connections to the poli-
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tician. The contribution is not a kind of contract between them but the
expression of a common world view and political project.
Thus, real corruption does not come from individual candidates
knowing for certain who gave them money, but rather from organized
money - a chief source of social inequality - operating outside of its
proper sphere of market influence to dominate political life and dis
tribute the opportunities of candidates and citizens to speak, persuade,
and debate. The Supreme Court came much closer to understanding
this sense of corruption in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
when it defined corruption not as quid pro quo arrangements but as
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form" and
are spent on influencing political outcomes but that reflect the will of
rich corporations, rather than the public's political ideas and choices.93
Thus, it is necessary to ask why the authors do not simply get rid of
the private donation booth and completely socialize opportunities for
candidacy with their Patriot plan. If we are going to spend $5 billion of
public money on the exceedingly complex patriot dollar system already quadrupling or quintupling the amount of money in the fed
eral campaign process - why not strike a complete blow for demo
cratic equality and abolish private campaign contributions? After all,
the authors recognize that, in recent federal elections, one-tenth of
one percent of the public gave one-half of the total campaign money
raised (p. 31), and the vast majority of Americans give no private con
tributions at all. Does it not complete the democratic logic of equal
public funding to give everyone, as much as possible, an equal money
stake in politically funded campaigns in the same way we all have an
equal vote? Why not structure the patriot system in such a way that
candidates must either choose to go patriot or go private but have no
intermediate option for a "mixed system"? (p. 33). Candidates and
voters would be invited to identify with either public values and
resources or private values and resources, a choice that would take on
different meanings at different points in time.
The authors are not immune to the logical force of the "abolition
ist argument," but seem to reject it, albeit reluctantly, for a hodge
podge of reasons. The first is the "realist caution" that, even "if the
abolitionist proposal were adopted, there would be many other ways
for the rich to project their influence" (p. 32). Of course, on this
familiar, depressing theory, we should abandon the whole enterprise
of campaign reform, as indeed Professor Smith urges us to do.
Regardless of what we do, the rich will control their own newspapers,
their own television stations, and various other bullhorns, so why not
let them keep their own politicians and privately bankrolled

93. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1 990).
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campaigns as well? Indeed, on this reasoning, it is not entirely clear
why we should maintain laws against political bribery. After all, there
will always be many other ways for the "rich to project their
influence," so why not let them buy the will of politicians directly,
which also has the virtue of being supremely efficient?
But surely the point of democratic progress against the tyranny of
wealth is to radically separate what is properly a market commodity
from what is not. The opportunities to run for office, to communicate
as a candidate, or to influence legislation should not be market com
modities bought and sold according to the whims and vicissitudes of
those with financial capital. We can surely embrace a "mixed system"
with respect to generalized background political discussion (what is
now called "issue speech") such that we can have both publicly subsi
dized speech, like public-cable-television networks, as well as privately
controlled speech, like newspapers. But the opportunity for the
wealthy to own their own newspapers or television stations hardly
j ustifies allowing them the further opportunity to project financial
power into the public sphere of campaign speech. Let them allocate
their $50 like everyone else. If it's good enough for the poor, it's good
enough for the rich.
But Ackerman and Ayres argue, much like the campaign-finance
romantic Bradley Smith, that making campaign contributions is "one
of many ways Americans show that they care about the fate of the
country, and thereby encourage others to engage in the enterprise of
active citizenship" (p. 34). Here, private giving is not seen as a threat
to democratic values but as the very embodiment of them. "Flatly
prohibiting private campaign contributions would be a real loss to the
civic culture - especially when we consider how the social meaning of
small gifts will change within the new regime of campaign finance" (p.
34). That is, some patriot donors will get so invested in the success of
their favorite candidates that they will decide to throw personal dol
lars after patriot dollars. This should be seen as virtuous, not corrupt
ing. More importantly, in the early stages of the campaign, when most
citizens are not focused enough to donate their patriot dollars, the pri
vate "donation booth is a means for more active citizens to put their
money where their mouth is" (p. 36) and launch candidacies with big
money contributions. This function is especially important, say the
authors, to enable minor parties and their candidates to get off the
ground (pp. 36-37).
Many of these arguments indeed sound an echo of Professor
Smith's elegiac defense of private giving. Smith, for example, praises
campaign fundraising as the most open and democratic form of politi
cal participation for ordinary, busy people.94 Yet, there are some hard
94. P. 82 ( "For most Americans, the best way to convert their talents to influence is
through cash contributions." ) .
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questions we need to ask Ackerman and Ayres. If everyone has fifty
patriot dollars to spend, why doesn't the use of this (public) private
money already sufficiently show that these voters "ca.re. about the fate
of their country" and "thereby encourage others to · engage in the
enterprise of active citizenship"? Is everything public to be automati
cally denigrated, even patriot dollars? Would it really represent a loss
to the civic culture to ask candidates to choose between the patriot
system and the wealth primary?
The argument that early private money will be crucial to propel
candidacies suggests not a virtue but a problem with the design of the
patriot plan. Recall that the authors would allow federal candidates to
raise large private-money contributions for exploratory funds, includ
ing up to $50,000 for House candidates, $250,000 for Senate candi
dates, and $1 million for presidential candidates. Individual donors
would be allowed to contribute up to $2,000, $10,000, and $20,000 to
each of these kinds of funds. This regime allows candidates to raise
private-money contributions to spend on soliciting patriot contribu
tions. But this pattern reincarnates the problem the plan is trying to
address. For candidates will raise big private contributions to invest in
media to tell voters to send in their patriot - and private - dollars to
their campaigns. There will thus be a private-money chase to spend on
a patriot and private-dollar chase, making the campaign a kind of re
lay race for money. And the distribution of patriot dollars will come to
mimic and echo, rather than replace, the distribution of private
dollars. The idea that this will benefit minor political parties and
candidates is unsubstantiated by the authors and seems farfetched
given the way private fundraising clearly benefits incumbents and their
parties today.
Indeed, we can go further at this point and ask the more funda
mental question: Granted that the Patriot plan usefully gets more
people involved in the campaign-giving process and would mark a
major improvement over the status quo, why should the capacity of
candidates to reach the electorate with their campaign message de
pend on their ability to raise money from the electorate in the first
place, whether it is from patriot contributions or checkbooks?
Consider a U.S. House race in which the incumbent "major party"
candidate raises $1 million (two-thirds in patriot donations and one
third in private donations), the other "major party" challenger raises
$500,000 (in the same ratio), and a "minor party" challenger raises
$100,000 (in the same ratio). Now, assume that the amount of money
raised will roughly translate into the candidates' capacity to purchase
and engage in political communication (which is, in essence, the whole
premise of the ruling in Buckley v. Valeo that expenditure caps are
unlawful "quantity restrictions" on political speech).95 The incumbent
95.

See

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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will have double the exposure and opportunity to communicate as his
or her major-party challenger and five times that of his or her minor
party challenger.
B ut why? To be sure, we have structured the mass-media market
in a way that shampoomakers will obtain differential access to the
public mind, but should the same market approach govern candidates
for the same public office from different political parties? Surely a dif
ferent norm should operate here: democratic equality. At its founda
tion, modern democracy insists upon the hard-won principle of one
person, one-vote. In the setting of legislative floor debates over par
ticular issues, it calls for one party-one equal bloc of time, with floor
leaders divvying up the minutes among the members waiting their turn
to speak. In Supreme Court oral arguments, contending sides in a
battle get precisely the same amount of time to plead their case
regardless of their wealth or the popularity of their cause.
When it comes to the mass media that operate on the people's air
waves and the people's minds, surely the principle of democratic
equality also calls for debates and forums in which candidates receive
equal floor time regardless of how much money they have or have
raised or which political party they represent. It similarly calls for the
award of equal free television time to candidates to make their pitch.
It is these standards, so familiar to the rest of the democratic world,
that we lose sight of when we simply continue and accelerate the
money chase with an otherwise attractive universal subsidy. It would
obviously be much cheaper for us as a society to save the money on
the expensive Patriot plan and simply force the television networks to
give us some of our time back so we can award it equally among the
candidates.
This approach would have a truly catalytic effect on third parties
and Independents. Outsider candidates cannot presently compete with
the money-drenched insider parties and are routinely closed out of
both public and private debates that favor the exclusionary "two party
system" whose candidates wear their major-party tags like a "title of
nobility."96 But this public airtime approach puts our (weak) commit
ment to multi-party democracy to the test. The self-perpetuating "two
party system" presupposes that "major party" candidates should never
have to debate candidates of lesser parties, who are presumed to be
frivolous, nonviable, or even crazy.
Yet, we have seen how outsider candidates, once allowed to
debate, can change the dynamics of a race - and win. In 1 998, Jesse

96. My allusion, of course, is to the constitutional prohibition against congressional
members awarding "titles of nobility" to themselves. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. For a
detailed examination of the problem of "debate gerrymandering" and the entrenchment of
the extra-constitutional "two party system," see Jamin B. Raskin, The Debate Gerrymander,
77 TEXAS L. REV. 1943 (1999).
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Ventura stunned the Minnesota establishment by winning the state's
governorship after a maverick run in which he was allowed to partici
pate in ten candidate debates with his Democratic and Republican
opponents. Ross Perot captured an astonishing 19% of the popular
vote in the 1 992 presidential election after he was allowed to debate
President George Bush and then-governor Bill Clinton. Congressman
Bernie Sanders won election to the House of Representatives from
Vermont in 1990 as an Independent after being trounced in four ear
lier statewide races. The exclusion of "minor party" candidates from
debates is an article of faith for the self-entrenching "two party
system" not because they are frivolous and destined to lose, but
because they are serious and might win.
In sum, Ackerman and Ayres err in assuming that a candidate's
current ability to raise money - even in a broad egalitarian pool should determine his or her opportunity to speak to the public. This is
a right, along with the right to debate one's opponents, that should be
foundational. Now, certainly candidates should have the opportunity
to pair off and square off with j ust one other candidate. "Major party"
candidates could merge their individual time allotments to hold an ex
clusive "major party candidate" debate, a right that clearly seems im
plied by Supreme Court decisions like Hurley97 and Dale.98 But surely
we should condition a candidate's general right to participate in a
public finance regime on his or her acceptance of at least one debate
challenge with all qualified candidates appearing together. Can
democracy require any less than at least one formal public debate?
Like Smith, Ackerman and Ayres join conservative criticism of
McCain-Feingold's ban on electioneering communications. "We reject
this effort to expand the regulatory net," they declare (p. 54). But it is
a mistake, as we have seen, to conflate corporations and unions and
assume that they should have the same political free-speech rights. If
we follow conservative Justices like Rehnquist and White, we can
understand the corporation to be a legally created social vehicle for
wealth accumulation without constitutionally rooted political rights. A
union, on the other hand, is a membership organization whose money
comes from the members' political commitments. Interference with its
right to mention officeholders within a certain period of elections does
indeed seem, as McCain-Feingold's critics tell us, to be a direct assault
97. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding that a public accommodations law requiring private citizens who organized a pa
rade to include among the marchers a group whose message the organizers did not wish to
convey violated the organizers' First Amendment rights); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Both cases stand for the proposition that private persons may
choose the participants of the forum in which they convey their message.
98. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (holding that a public-accommodations law prohibiting the Boy
Scouts' selective admissions policies violated the organization's First Amendment right of
expressive association).
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on speech. Treating corporations and unions as peas in a pod has
political appeal but little logical coherence as First Amendment
doctrine. In the face of massive corporate criminality and interference
with our politics, we need much clearer thinking about the constitu
tional status of corporate power.
In the final analysis, Ackerman and Ayres have structured a help
ful, detailed blueprint for substantially modifying, if not entirely trans
forming, our Wild West federal campaign-finance roundup. To many
conservative readers, like Professor Smith perhaps, the blueprint will
smack of an overgrown Hillary Clinton-style national campaign
finance bureaucracy, despite the authors' passionate protests that they
want to remain market driven. To more radical democrats who have
already cast their lot with the promising state-based clean-money re
forms, this plan hatched at Yale Law School may look like a
distraction from a popular movement that is forcing candidates on the
ground to choose between public- and private-financing plans and in
the process, liberating state elections from the tyranny of big money.
But Professors Ackerman and Ayres have developed a plan and
laid a marker in the sand for campaign vouchers, just as Professor
Smith has developed a plan - that of no plan at all - and hoisted the
flag of libertarian deregulation. All are to be commended for their
intellectual seriousness as our activist conservative Court takes up
McCain-Feingold. Whatever happens, we will need new paradigms
and new ideas to face the awesome dilemma of reconciling private
money with public elections, and market economics with democratic
politics.

